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Abstract
An existing pseudo-commodity and a smart contracts framework allow
the creation of a purely automatic and self-sufficient price-stable cryp-
tocurrency, without human intervention. This new currency, we denomi-
nated Toroid1 or TRD, can be used more extensively for commerce than
pseudo commodity cryptocurrencies due to its lower volatility. Also, is
suitable for investment, as the tokens in each account multiply, return in-
terest, when the market grows. Like the controlled fiat money of a central
bank plus the benefits of an inflation-adjusted perpetuity bond. It elimi-
nates the need of debt as the basic mechanism of the economy, although
allows banking and further lending on top of it. Collateral in base coin, for
example BTC or ETH, can be added to bootstrap your own Toroid invest-
ment or withdrawed after a very small investment period. So, the Toroids
are not created from nothing nor have a limited monetary base. The
minimum investment period can be very small, for example one day, and
you keep the interest but you can return the Toroids and refund your col-
lateral. That is a one-side only peg to a deflationary crypto-commodity.
The stability is guaranteed by endogenous measurements of number of
transactions and wallet pro-rated rebasement of balance to reduce volatil-
ity of price. Each account has its own rebasement due to the account
creation timestamp. Rebasement control mechanism is progressive dur-
ing initial bootstrap period because price manipulation protection is more
severe when the capital involved is smaller. Rebasement has a quick pos-
itive start to incentivize early adopters that see only big growth in their
TRD account during bootstrap period. Finally, the new rebasement con-
trol makes it economically infeasible for an attacker targeting the coin
with manipulated transaction volume if we set the minimum rebasement
greater than profits from massive currency manipulation. This protection
increases its robustness and effectiveness over time because a coin with
bigger capitalization is more difficult to manipulate.
1 v0.106 UNPUBLISHED WORK: All rights reserved. This work is not to be published
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1 Introduction
There is some discussion that we need new cryptocurrencies that can keep the
pace of the economy, that can grow with the economy. Possible best alternatives
are not based on debt. But still need to be dynamic, as pseudo commodities
like Bitcoin have an almost static supply after some time.
With Ether, the money supply grows faster than BTC, but still
slow enough to have a growth rate that tends towards 0 (on the
order of 1/t). Assuming the economy grows faster than a linear
rate (which historically has always been the case), Ether is also a
"deflationary currency". [7]
Current fiat currencies based on debt are facing a huge crisis of trust due to
growth stagnation in the developed countries and citizens and entrepreneurs
demanding more freedom to generate their own financial assets. Also, many
players are demanding a reduction in the financial friction such as fees, so ev-
eryone can invest on small and big scale. Most important, if big players don’t
get so unproportioned returns on investment compared to smaller players that
can’t afford expensive sophisticated funds and management services, the later
can enter the game.
Ultimately, excessive debt resembles a Ponzi scheme. Nations,
businesses, and individuals need to borrow ever-increasing amounts
to repay existing borrowings and maintain economic growth. In the
half-century leading up to 2008, the amount of debt needed to create
US$1 of GDP in the US increased from US$1-2 to US$4-5. This rapid
rise is insustainable, given an aging population, slower growth, and
low inflation. [6]
Similarly to blood cells that are generated in abundance from bone marrow stem
cells, and similarly to gold or silver-backed paper currencies, we are proposing
that the current robust cryptographic pseudo-commodities [1] and the smart
contract platform are used as a basis for pseudo-fiat currencies that will be
bootstrapped by depositing basic coins (will be using ETH in example and first
token) to generate a sub-currency that has enough features to have a more
stable price, to have an non-limited monetary supply and to provide economical
unfeasibility of currency manipulation.
To obtain all the features of currency which are scarcity, fungibility, divisibil-
ity, durability, and transferability, and to obtain the three main uses of currency
which are as a medium of exchange, as a unit of account and as a store of value,
we need our currency to be more stable than Bitcoin or gold. Who can pay for
a coffee in Bitcoin if the coffee shop owner knows the price can change 10% in
minutes? Currencies which includes features to stabilize its price are sometimes
called stable coins [5] or if they use an elastic monetary base are called Hayek
Money [4]. Other technical definition can categorize our stable coin as a smart
beta bond [3], an intelligent bond with a market exposure β lower than 1, that
indicates an investment with lower volatility than the market.
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Some stable coins have been designed to support collateral deposits to gen-
erate bonds in a way to bootstrap the new currency [2]. In our proposed de-
sign, we also use collateral to bootstrap the new currency but the funds remain
frozen only a small period and you have the liberty to withdraw it but you
keep the variable interest rate you recieved (and can be negative). Also, the
stable coin we proposed is no two-way pegged to an external basket of existing
currencies. Is only one way pegged, price can only be smaller, than the basic
pseudo-commodity that fuels the smart contracts consensus framework. We also
need some mechanism to deflect currency manipulation attacks or at least to
make them economically unfeasible.
2 Features
2.1 General features
The Toroid cryptocurrency fund can be implemented easily on a cryptocurrency
platform with smart contracts such as RootStock or Ethereum. It will have a
one-way peg to the underlying deflationary token of the platform, such as BTC
(in the RSK platform) or ETH (in the Ethereum platform). This results on
the price of the TRD being smaller than the underlying pseudo-commodity
but its monetary base being elastic. We will call base coin to the underlying
BTC or ETH that fuels the smart contract platform and serves as collateral for
bootstrapping ICOs (Initial Coin Offerings) and investment on the new more
stable currency. Also, we will call stable coin or TRD to the new sub-currency
defined by the smart contract.
We have an automatic rebasement in place, that is, the amount of TRDs
in circulation is controlled by the smart contract that represents the fund and
all the accounts or wallets. The rebasement is pro-rated across all wallets. An
account with twice as TRD compared to another account will get twice of the
rebasement adjustment measured in TRD coins. After the initial bootstrap
period where is only positive, the rebasement can be positive or negative. A
recurrent time-period, such as 1 day, 1 hour or 5 minutes is fixed as the TRD
monetary base adjustment. For example, if we choose a 1-day period and 12AM
GMT as the time of the rebasement and the smart contract decided that the
current daily rebasement is 0.1% positive then all account have their balance
increased on 0.1% to compensate endogenous metrics that have been measured
on the previous period.
2.2 One-way peg to underlying deflationary token
This means that the price of the TRD will always be lower than a fixed amount
of base cryptocurrency (we choose Ethereum platform and ETH base token for
the sake of example). The one-way peg is implemented as following:
1. to open a wallet with 1 TRD you need to deposit a fixed collateral, for
example 1 decibitcoin (1/10 of ETH or 1 dETH );
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2. you can buy any amount of extra TRDs by depositing more collateral with
the same rate of 1 dETH;
3. the collateral is held as collateral in the smart contract and associated
with your wallet until you close you decide, if you want, to return the
original TRD amount;
4. to close your account and get back the complete collateral you need to
have at least in your account the amount of TRDs proportional to the
amount of collateral.
The result of this design is that you can buy 1 TRD with 1 dETH or less, but
never the price of 1 TRD will exceed 1 dETH, the fixed amount of collateral
in the configuration. During the bootstrap of the Toroids there are incentives
to deposit collateral and get the TRD interest added. At some point, during
the Toroids will be less expensive on an exchange and you also get the return
of the investment of you buy them on an exchange. Ideally, during bootstrap
and after that during the first moments of the Toroids TRD owners will have
little incentives to sell their TRD so new users will directly invest collateral to
get their Toroids. If at some point PriceTRD > PriceETH the arbitrageurs will
start funding the Toroid Fund to get cheap TRD and the price of the TRD will
drop. If PriceTRD < PriceETH investors will analyze the estimated interest of
ETH deposits returned in TRD to decide if they want to fund with ETH or buy
TRD directly in the open market. If the TRD in circulation are few, then users
that want to refund their ETH will need to buy TRD so the price of TRD will
increase until PriceTRD > PriceETH when arbitrageurs will start funding and
increasing the TRD supply.
2.3 Elastic currency supply with security limits
On an initial stage the currency price won’t be stable but will grow its supply to
incentivize the early adopters. This period lasts time T , for example 3 months.
Also, the rebasement is by-design limited by the cost of an attack, so every
attack is economically infeasible. We can model this by saying that rebasement
ratio R consists of three components:
R(t, v, s) =
{
RI(t) + min{RGas(t, v, s), RV ol(t, v)} if RV ol(t, v) ≥ 0
RI(t) + max{−RGas(t, v, s), RV ol(t, v)} if RV ol(t, v) < 0
TRD supply S is rebased accross all wallets, according to
S(t) := S(t− 1) ∗ (1 +R(t, v))
Volume v is considered only as the number of transactions during the last
period. We do not consider trading volume in TRDs because with only few big
transactions any Sybil attack can be performed by many users or one user with
many wallets. Supply S is the total supply of TRDs in the system. Time step
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variable t help us estimated time from bootstrap and analyze the previous steps
during computations.
The initial RI ratio starts for example in 1.10 and slowly converges to 1.0 as
the incentives for early adopters should fade after the other rebasement compo-
nents becomes the main component. Example:
RI(t) = 1/(t+ 10) + 1
In this case RI(0) = 1.1 and RI(90) = 1.01, so after 90 days the initial
incentives per daily period reduces to only 1% from the 10% per day at the
beginning. This initial rebasement ratio is not a function of last period’s volume
of transactions.
As of RGas, this section of the rebasement places a limit on the variation
based on the cost of the transaction, to make the currency manipulation eco-
nomically unfeasible for an attacker that wants to generate a massive number
of fake transactions. As gas, based on the Ethereum platform, we mean the
cost measured in native deflationary token (ETH) of executing different smart
contracts. If we have during the last period v wallet transactions, considering all
the wallets in the system, and during the previous period there were no transac-
tion at all2. This is the worst-case scenario. We assume in this discussion that
the price is gas is 20 gwei and the cost of basic transaction in the Ethereum
platform is 20000 gas. And we consider that each transaction, a transference
of TRDs from one wallet to another, costs a fixed amount of gas, measured in
fractions of underlying base token (in our example is ETH). Then one basic
wallet transference, costs 0.0004 ETH. If all activity during the period was only
a Sybil attack then the cost of the attack is:
CSybil = v ∗ 0.0004 ETH ≥ v ∗ 0.004 TRD
We used the knowledge that 1 TRD is one-way pegged to 1 deciETH. If we
have v = 104, an attack of 10 thousand spurious transactions, then the cost for
the attacker is CSybil = 4 ETH ≥ 40 TRD. So, if we limit the profit from a
malicious Sybil rebasement to 40 TRD, in this case, then we make the attack
economically infeasible. Then if total supply s of TRDs:
RGas ≤ 40 TRD/s = v ∗ 4 ∗ 10−3TRD/s = v
s
∗ 0.004 TRD
Then 1+RGas is the ratio allowed to limit Sybil attacks including an increase
in the number of transactions. Similarly, 1−RGasif the number of transactions
have been suddenly reduced in one period. We are assuming that currency sup-
ply rebasement is very quickly absorbed but market demand reflected linearly
on price changes. Is a very simple model but other more sophisticated can be
implemented in future versions. An ideal TRD transaction, hostile or ordinary,
will never contribute more than its gas transaction cost to the total rebasement
measured in ETH.
2Remember that this is not transaccion volume, but the number of transactions. Other
factors can also be used.
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Figure 1: Price of Bitcoin versus Price of Simulated Toroid, only with smart
rebasement, from 2010-08-18 to 2017-04-25.
The main type of attacks to the stabilized cryptocurrency we want to prevent
are pump and dump. Happen when simulated or exaggerated interest on the
new coin is showed in the market to inflate its price and then the inventory of
coin is liquidated by the attacker at an unusually higher price. Because of this
type attack also the price of the coin plummets to very low levels.
3 Simulated results
We simulated the behaviour of Toroid price compared to Bitcoin assuming the
market absorbs the rebasement and adjust completely the coin to a new price.
We can see in Figures 1 and 2 the price evolution over time of a simulated version
or Toroid token. We see that the gas limit protection comes with a drawback,
that is, a less powerful control over the price. Something similar is shown in
Figures 3 and 4 where the token supply is shown, and including the gas limit
makes the supply of the simulated Toroid grow slowly but still exponentially
compared to base Bitcoin.
4 Conclusions
We proposed a system of stabilized cryptocurrencies based on a Smart contract
platform that allow us to use the currency fueling the Smart contracts as collat-
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Figure 2: Price of Bitcoin versus Price of Simulated Toroid, smart rebasement
and gas limit protection, from 2010-08-18 to 2017-04-25. We assumed an initial
supply of 10000 TRD and gas cost per transaction equivalent to 0.1 TRD.
Figure 3: Supply of Bitcoin versus Supply of Simulated Toroid, only smart
rebasement, from 2010-08-18 to 2017-04-25. We assumed an initial supply of
10000 TRD.
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Figure 4: Supply of Bitcoin versus Supply of Simulated Toroid, smart rebase-
ment and gas limit protection, from 2010-08-18 to 2017-04-25. We assumed an
initial supply of 10000 TRD and gas cost per transaction equivalent to 0.1 TRD.
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eral for the generation of the new coin interest. This system is not an artificial
Ponzi scheme because the interest generated, based on endogenous metrics, can
also be negative, the holding period can be is very small, and the stabiliza-
tion of the new currency is adding value to the new currency and improving its
conditions to be used as means of exchange for goods and services.
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